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Abstract
The study of quantitative easing (QE) policies has so far focussed on which assets
the central bank should buy, and on how it can pursue its targets for real and financial
stability. This paper emphasizes instead the funding of QE by central bank liabilities,
with an eye on achieving the inflation target. Looking backwards, it shows evidence
that post-QE1, the U.S. banking sector became saturated with reserves, so the central
bank can control the size of the balance sheet independently of its interest-rate policy.
Using options data for U.S. inflation, it shows that while QE1 had an e↵ect on expected
inflation, further rounds of QE did not. Looking forward, it estimates the feasibility
of keeping the liabilities of the central bank at a high level in terms of a solvency
upper bound. Finally, it argues that the central bank’s interest-rate policy is not out
of ammunition when it comes to targeting inflation, since there are radical proposals
on the composition of its liabilities, their maturity and the way to remunerate them
that could be employed.
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I Introduction
Quantitative easing (QE) refers to a set of monetary policies that expand the size of the
balance sheet of the central bank by purchasing government bonds, and funds it by issuing
monetary base. It started on a large scale in Japan in March of 2001 and was later adopted,
between 2008 and 2009, by the other three major central banks. Even though they all
initially stated that QE was a temporary measure, the size of their balance sheets in 2016
is as large as ever, and both the ECB and the Bank of Japan have suggested expanding QE
further. The central-bank balance sheet has become an active policy tool.
Not so long ago, discussion of a new monetary policy tool would have been dominated by
its implications for the supply of money, for nominal interest rates, and for inflation. Yet, in
recent years, research and discussions have instead emphasized what QE implies for real and
financial stability, and they have focussed on what central banks buy, at what price, to sell
when. This shift is understandable and perhaps desirable, in response to dismal economic
growth in developed economies and to the long-lasting ripples of a financial crisis. Moreover,
it has paid o↵ in terms of a better understanding of the e↵ects on the economy and financial
markets of di↵erent types of publicly-funded asset purchases.1
Figure 1 shows the balance sheet of four major central banks over the past 10 years, after
some e↵ort to consolidate and harmonize items into common categories that is explained in
the appendix. Above the horizontal axis is the asset side of the balance sheet. Of particular
research attention over the past few years have been: the Federal Reserve’s 2008 growth
and quick elimination of “Others” as a result of its unconventional policies; the ECB’s
increase in direct holding of securities; the Bank of England’s funding a separate vehicle, the
Asset Purchase Facility, to buy gilts with an indemnity from the fiscal authorities; and the
Bank of Japan’s large increase of long-term government bond holdings past 2010, making its
balance sheet more than twice as large as that of the other three banks. In these discussions,
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when the liabilities side was mentioned, it often came with vague mentions of “printing
money”. Inflation concerns were swept to the side by noting that long-term mean inflation
expectations remained anchored and on target. This paper’s goal is to shift attention back
to the other side of the balance sheet, and back to the other leg of the dual mandate.2
Starting with the central-banks’ liabilities, figure 1 shows that in contrast with the variety
on the asset side, the change in the balance sheet of these four central banks looks the same on
the liabilities side. All four financed their purchases via overnight interest-paying voluntarily-
held deposits by financial institutions at the central bank. I will call these reserves for short.
This uniform development is remarkable on several accounts. First, from the perspective of
history, this liability was minor in these central banks before 2007, and did not even exist in
the Federal Reserve, since the Fed had no legal authority to pay interest on reserves. Second,
from the perspective of economics, many textbooks still refer to reserves and currency as
interchangeable parts of the monetary base, when in fact their time-series correlation is
close to zero. Third, from the perspective of the holders of reserves, in 2007, U.S. banks
held slightly more securities issued by the Treasury than they held reserves at the central
bank; by the end of 2015, banks held twice more reserves than Treasuries. Fourth, from the
perspective of financial markets, the value of reserves is higher than the outstanding amount
of almost any security with a common issuer and common maturity in these four economic
regions. Finally, from the perspective of monetary policy, the central bank can choose both
the quantity of nominal reserves as well as the interest at which to remunerate them.
Turning attention to the other leg of the dual mandate, figure 2 evaluates how these
four major central banks have performed with respect to their inflation goal. The figure is
constructed as follows. For each central bank, the log price index is set at zero the last time
the mandate of the central bank was reset. All four central banks have a target of 2% annual
change in the price level, set up at di↵erent dates, so a dashed line is drawn forward in time
to represent the actual target, and circles are drawn moving backwards in time to capture
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an hypothetical target. The actual price level is then superimposed, using data on the index
that the mandate refers to, and normalizing to equal the target in the year the mandate was
announced. Therefore, at every date, each chart in figure 2 reports how far is the central
bank from the ideal price-level target.3
The ECB has been the closest to the ideal price-level target, while the Bank of England
was the furthest in 2015 after successive deviations following the financial crisis. Both the
Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan have been close to the target since their 2012 and
2013 mandates, respectively, but the performance of the U.S. price level for more than a
decade before was also very close to the hypothetical target, while the BoJ was quite far.
Overall, central banks were successful in the past. In the future, there is reason for concern.
Both in the Eurosystem and United States, since 2014 the price level has been increasingly
below target, and the same is true from 2015 onwards for the Japan and the United Kingdom.
Forecasts of inflation over the next 2-3 years for all regions, from either surveys or financial
markets, do not show any signs of a correction upwards. Therefore, by current estimates, all
but the United Kingdom are expected to be below target by at least 6% by 2019.
This downside risk justifies moving attention back to inflation and away from the recent
focus on financial and real stability. Since reserves are the unit of account in the economy,
inflation is by definition the change in the real value of reserves. If there is some link, even
if tenuous, between the size of central-bank liabilities and the price level, then changes in
the funding side of QE should a↵ect inflation. Therefore, from an inflation perspective, one
would like to consider the e↵ect of keeping the current size of the central-bank balance sheet,
or perhaps expanding it through further QE.
This paper discusses the funding side of QE and its implications for inflation. It provides
a central-bank liability-theory of QE to complement existing asset-theories of QE, presents
some evidence in favor of it, and discusses its policy implications. Throughout, it analyses
the type and size of reserves that are issued as part of QE policies, and their expected e↵ects
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on the price level. This leads to four conclusions, one in each of the sections that follows.
First, section II argues that the market for bank reserves in the United States has been
saturated since about 2011. Theoretically, post-QE the supply of reserves shifted far enough
to the right that it now intersects the demand curve at its horizontal segment. Empirically,
bank-level data on assets shows how QE significantly changed the distribution of reserves
deposits by banks. Second, section III makes the case that once the economy is saturated,
only the interest paid on reserves but not the size of the balance sheet have an e↵ect on
inflation, so they can be used as independent policy tools. Using data on inflation options
to perform an event-study analysis of the e↵ects of QE on inflation, it shows that the first
round of QE shifted the distribution of expected inflation. But, consistent with the theory,
since QE2, further expansions of the balance sheet have had little to no e↵ect on inflation
expectations across their entire distributions. Third, section IV asks whether keeping the
current elevated size of the central bank’s balance sheet, or even engaging in further QE, is
feasible. Keeping the focus on liabilities and inflation, it discusses the constraint posed by
the solvency of the central bank in terms of a solvency upper bound on the size of QE. The
United States in 2016 is well below this bound. Fourth, section V argues that the central
bank is not out of firepower to a↵ect inflation, even if it focuses solely on reserves and their
remuneration. It discusses three radical proposals for innovating on the future composition
of QE, in case inflation starts deviating significantly from target. The first replaces reserves
by currency, often called “helicopter drops”. The second uses reserves that have payments
indexed to the price level. The third issues medium-term reserves with promised future
interest rates.
Finally, section VI concludes by drawing the link between the needed new study of
reserves and the old study of monetary aggregates. This paper’s conservative message for
inflation-targeting in the future is to return to the pre-crisis consensus of following rules
for interest rates and communicating present and future changes in the interest-rate path,
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leaving QE aside to potentially deal with other goals. Three changes to this old consensus
are proposed. First, that the main target interest rate in the United States stops being the
Federal Funds rate and becomes the interest on reserves. Second, that the return to a lean
Fed balance sheet does not go all the way back to the pre-crisis zero reserves, but keeps the
market for reserves saturated. Third, that if radical policies are needed to bring inflation
back on target, these take the form of innovations on the composition of the central-bank
liabilities that keep the focus on the return on the reserves that the central bank can control.
II An economy saturated with reserves
Reserves are one of the many financial assets that banks can choose to hold. A bank with
a positive balance of reserves at the central bank can use it to pay for securities or to settle
credits from another bank, and in doing so adjust the share of reserves in its overall portfolio.
Moreover, the bank can request that the central bank exchanges its reserves for currency
at any time and purchase goods and services with the banknotes, converting this form of
savings into expenditure. In many regards, reserves are not all that di↵erent from overnight
loans to other financial institutions or even from short-term government bonds.
At the same time, the history of reserves is special. The Federal Reserve was founded in
1913 partly as a response to frequent financial crises that led to mistrust in existing payment
systems. Because banks issue means of payment, every hour the credits over one bank are
used to pay debits to another bank. These must be very regularly settled in a clearing house,
using either currency or some other clearing-house means of payment. Since an individual
bank’s financial health is private information to its managers, a successful clearing house has
to constantly monitor its participants, as well as keep its own managers in check from the
temptation to over-print house money. The Federal Reserve as a public institution was set
up to solve both problems, by being given broad powers to regulate banks and, crucially, the
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mandate to issue the house means of payment that all banks would accept to settle interbank
claims: reserves.
Because of this unique role, reserves have two properties that are not shared with other
financial assets. First, the central bank is the monopoly issuer of reserves. To support this
function, central banks were also given the power to issue banknotes that are legal tender
and which can be exchanged for reserves at a one-to-one exchange rate.4 Therefore, reserves
are the unit of account in the economy: they define the price level as the inverse of the real
value of reserves. As the monopoly issuer or the unit of account, the central bank can freely
choose which interest to pay on these reserves. It can always honor this promise by issuing
more reserves.
Second, only banks can hold reserves. This implies that, because the market for reserves
must clear, the aggregate amount of reserves in the overall banking system plus banknotes
is determined by the central bank. The central bank perfectly controls their sum, even if it
does not control the breakdown between the two components of the monetary base, nor the
distribution of reserves across banks.
These two properties combined imply that the central bank can in principle choose both
the quantity of the monetary base and the nominal interest rate paid on reserves. Whether
it can also control the quantity of reserves, and do so independently of the interest rate that
it pays, depends on the demand for reserves by banks.
II.A The demand for reserves
Figure 3 portrays a fictional market for reserves.5 The vertical axis has the real price of re-
serves. While they pay a nominal interest rate that is fixed ex ante by the central bank, their
ex post real return also depends on the realization of inflation. In turn, it is the comparison
of this return with that of similar assets that determines the relative opportunity cost of
investing in reserves instead of these alternatives. The real price of reserves is approximately
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equal to the di↵erence between the expected risk-adjusted real return on alternative assets
minus that on reserves.
The demand curve is then plotted in figure 3. Central banks usually set a minimum
required amount of reserves that banks must hold so that, in all but exceptional days, they
can satisfy immediate claims by other banks in the clearing house and obtain banknotes to
satisfy deposit withdrawals. As with almost all financial regulation, this is also a form of
financial repression, since banks are forced to demand these reserves regardless of their price
(or return). The demand for reserves therefore starts as a vertical line at the level vr. Before
QE, the supply curve was very near this level and the market for reserves cleared close to vr.
Required reserves were a tool for financial regulation (and for taxing banks), not for active
monetary policy.6
A lower price for reserves raises demand up to a level vs, when the market is satiated.
The downward slope reflects the services that reserves may provide in the form of liquidity.
The scarcity of this liquidity leads to a premium being priced onto reserves, and the smaller
this premium is, the larger the demand for reserves. There is some point though at which
banks have all the liquidity they want. Perhaps this happens very quickly when reserves
are only a small fraction of bank’s portfolios, or perhaps it happens only when there are
trillions of reserves outstanding, but in a world with a finite amount of goods and services
to buy, the desire for liquidity must have a limit. This is vs, the point at which the famous
Friedman rule is achieved because banks are flooded with all the liquidity they want at no
opportunity cost. From that point onwards, the opportunity cost of holding reserves (the
liquidity premium) disappears and banks are indi↵erent towards holding more reserves. No
arbitrage takes over so, just as is the case for other liquid financial assets, the demand curve
becomes close to horizontal.
Does the supply curve for reserves look vertical, as plotted in the figure, or do banks
substitute any supply of reserves for currency? And has QE saturated the banking system
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of advanced economies with reserves? The remainder of this section looks for evidence that
the United States is in the horizontal segment of the demand curve.
II.B The link between reserves, currency and and interest rates
Figure 4 plots aggregate reserves between 2005 and 2015. The e↵ect of QE jumps to the
eye, with the announcements of the three waves of the program leading to quick and sharp
increases in reserves issued and held.
The central bank does not perfectly control the amount of reserves because of its commit-
ment to exchange reserves for currency one-to-one at all dates. While QE was implemented
by issuing reserves to buy assets, banks could have asked to exchange those reserve balances
for banknotes, so that hypothetically the aggregate market-clearing amount of reserves out-
standing could have not changed at all. If the zero nominal interest rate paid on reserves
were the e↵ective zero lower bound, then private agents would be indi↵erent between cash
and reserves, and the supply curve could take any shape. Figure 4 also plots the banknotes
held by banks, but it is barely indistinguishable from the horizontal axis since this is so
small relative to both the size of reserves and its change in absolute value after QE. Curi-
ously, the ratio of banknotes to reserves is almost exactly the same in June 2016 as it was in
June 2009, at about 0.04. It is possible that banks could have passed on the banknotes to
households and firms before answering the survey. Figure 4 therefore also plots all currency
in circulation. QE has very little e↵ect on the steady growth of currency, and the spikes in
the issuance of reserves barely registered any noticeable tick up in banknotes. To conclude,
there was little substitution from reserves to currency even when the interest rate on reserves
was zero, so the central bank’s reserves issued matches very closely with reserves ultimately
outstanding. Portraying the supply of reserves as a vertical line is a good approximation.
If the demand curve is horizontal, then the interest on reserves should be very close
to that of similar investments. Even taking away the two special properties of reserves
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discussed above, there is no asset with the exact same payo↵ as reserves in all states of the
world. Loans in the Federal Funds market are close, being also denominated in dollars and
paying an overnight nominal interest rate, but they have an (even if small) amount of default
risk. The same applies to private overnight repos or swaps due to their counterparty risk.
Treasury securities are close to as default-free as reserves, but they are issued at maturities
longer than overnight. The best that can be done is to look at the interest rates in the
Federal Funds market and in 3-month Treasury bills to construct the di↵erence from the
interest on reserves as the real price of reserves.
This price will not be precisely zero for at least four reasons. First, because of the
di↵erences in maturity and default risk. Second, because only some financial institutions
can deposit reserves at the Federal Reserve, only some others can trade in the Federal Funds
market, while investing in Treasury bills is open to all. Third, in the case of the Federal
Funds rate, because of changes in the liquidity of that market, which have been significant
during the years of QE.7 And fourth, because there may be small fluctuations over time in the
expectation of risk-adjusted inflation and in the inflation risk premium due to a covariance
between inflation and the interest-rate di↵erences. Therefore, there will be fluctuations in
the di↵erence between the interest on reserves, and the interest on federal funds and Treasury
bills, but these should have little e↵ect on the demand for reserves, for the demand curve to
be e↵ectively flat.
Table 1 takes a first stab at testing this hypothesis. It uses monthly data on reserves from
the end of 2011 until June 2016, and regresses it on the two measures of the price of reserves.
I consider a variety of specifications that deal di↵erently with the trend in reserves during
this period and alternate in the choice of which of the two measures of the price of reserves to
consider. The first five specifications reported in the table give the same clear answer. The
semi-elasticity of reserves to interest rates is not statistically significantly di↵erent from zero,
and it is always estimated to be quite small, where for the largest estimate in specification
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(5), a one standard deviation increase in the di↵erence between reserves and federal funds
rates (of 4 basis points) would lower the demand for reserves by 0.8%. The sample has few
observations since the hypothesis is that the market for reserves has only been saturated for
less than 5 years, so the results can only be tentative. One check is to see what happens if
we go further back and extend the sample until November 2008, when the Federal Reserve
started paying interest on reserves. Because this includes a time before QE had expanded
the amount of reserves to a significant size, it should include observations when the market
was in the downward-sloping range for demand. Indeed, the estimated semi-elasticity in
the last column of the table is now two to four times larger than in the other columns and
statistically significant.8
The data is therefore consistent with QE having pushed the vertical supply for reserves
su ciently to the right so that, from 2011 onwards, the United States has been in the range
where the demand for reserves is horizontal. The market for reserves is saturated, and the
Fed can independently choose the amount of reserves and their interest rate.
II.C The distribution of the reserves-deposit ratio
These aggregate results may mask a great amount of heterogeneity across banks. It is well
known that a few banks hold a very large share of the reserves outstanding; the 10 largest
reserve holders had approximately 65% of the entire stock in 2011.9 Perhaps only a few
banks are indeed satiated in their demand for liquidity, and idiosyncratic bank shocks could
easily push the market for reserves lack to the left of the satiation point. To investigate this
possibility, I turn to bank-level data on reserve deposits.
Three broad types of institutions can hold reserves at the Federal Reserve Banks: com-
mercial banks, savings banks including trust companies and thrifts, and foreign banks or
branches that are not covered by deposit insurance. The Federal Reserve’s H.3 and H.4.1
statistical releases used in figure 4 report the total reserves, but not their distribution by
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holder. However, all of these institutions but for credit unions and a few thrift institutions
must report their reserve deposits as part of their quarterly supervisory reports, the Call
Reports, with the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). I use the
end-of-year reports for 2005 and 2007, before QE started, in 2011 by the end of the large
QE1 and QE2 programs, and in 2015, the last year in the sample. The data covers approxi-
mately 6,000 financial institutions. Aggregating over the bank-level data and comparing to
the Fed’s aggregate reports, the correlation between the two series is almost perfect, with the
bank-level data covering approximately 90% of aggregate reserves holdings. Because these
are regulatory filings, they come with a wealth of information on each bank’s balance sheet,
including size, deposits, and holdings of government securities.
Figure 5 starts by looking at the ratio of reserves to deposits for each individual bank,
plotting its cumulative density function at the four dates. Before QE, the many deposit-
insured institutions in the sample had to hold a minimum ratio of reserves to deposits. As
the distribution for 2005 and 2007 shows, most of them did just that, so that in 2007, the
median reserve-deposit ratio was 0.10%, and the interquartile range was a narrow 0.38%.
Most institutions had an inelastic demand for reserves, with only a few at the margin holding
a large amount of reserves.
Given the enormous increase in total reserves, it is not surprising that the distributions
post-QE look dramatically di↵erent from those pre-QE. More interesting is that, above the
last quartile, the entire distribution shifted rightwards. It was not just those previously at
the margin that increased their reserves deposits, but the majority of banks started having
reserves well in excess of their regulatory requirements. The whole density of banks’ reserves
shifts right and spreads out. Many more banks are voluntarily choosing to hold reserves at
the central bank while taking into account the opportunity cost of doing so. This suggests
that many banks are in the horizontal segment of their individual demand curve, willing to
hold more reserves if the central bank chooses to issue them.
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Table 2 confirms this in a di↵erent way, by mapping each bank’s reserves-deposit ra-
tio across time, and calculating the correlation across banks. The banks that held a high
reserves-deposit ratio in 2005 are not the same that hold higher reserves ten years later: the
correlation is a mere 2%. The correlation is likewise very low between reserves-deposits in
2011 and in 2015. Relative to before QE, the current holders of reserves seem to no longer
be holding reserves solely to satisfy regulation.
II.D The share of reserves in banks’ portfolios
Another way to describe being on the horizontal segment of the demand curve is that reserves
are now one of many assets that an individual bank chooses to hold more or less of in its
portfolio. With QE, reserves became a regular highly liquid financial asset, with returns
pinned down by arbitrage forces rather than by fluctuations in the quantity supplied.
Figure 6 and Table 3 try to confirm this hypothesis by again plotting the distribution
across banks and the correlation across time, but now for the ratio of reserves to assets. Post-
QE, the portfolio shares are higher both on average and for most banks, with the median
rising from 0.07% in 2007 to 2.91% in 2011. Moreover, they are more spread out, as the
interquartile range went from 0.29% to 6.51% between 2007 and 2011. This is even more
noticeable at the top, where the di↵erence between the 99 and the 90 percentiles of portfolio
shares went from 1.25% to 9.92% in just four years.
Yet another way to see the change in the composition of banks’ portfolios, and in the
distribution of the reserves share across banks, is to compare their reserve deposits with
their holdings of Treasury securities. Most U.S. banks hold no Treasuries, and this has not
changed with QE. The share of banks holding zero securities barely changed from 79% in
2005 to 78% in 2015, and the share of banks for which Treasury securities are less than 2%
of their assets stayed completely unchanged at 94%. Yet, the share of banks that hold more
reserves than Treasuries increased significantly from 79% to 90%.
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III Does QE raise inflation?
If the supply curve is vertical and to the right of vs, then the central bank can keep on
expanding QE and banks will keep on holding these reserves. At the same time, the central
bank no longer controls the real equilibrium price of reserves. What the central bank freely
sets, as always, is the nominal interest rate on these reserves. But this is approximately
equal to the sum of the expected rate of inflation and the equilibrium real interest rate.
In turn, in the short run with nominal rigidities, expected inflation moves little, and the
real interest rate depends negatively on current output growth, which depends positively on
unexpected inflation. All combined, a permanently higher nominal interest rate on reserves
comes with higher inflation (the Fisher e↵ect), while a temporarily higher nominal interest
rate on reserves lowers inflation (the Phillips e↵ect). Pinning down precisely by how much,
or drawing the exact line between temporary and permanent, is a perennial topic of study in
monetary economics, which is particularly complicated because models say that it depends
on past and future inflation, on whether the policy change persists, on whether it was
unexpected, and on whether it was a reaction to endogenous variables.10 But the basic point
remains: in an economy saturated with reserves, the central bank can freely choose that
interest rate on reserves and this pins down inflation.11
Before QE started, an increase in reserves would have moved the market for reserves
along a downward-sloping demand. The central bank could not independently choose the
size of its balance sheet and the target for an overnight interest rate. The two were tied
together, so a QE policy was an expansionary monetary policy in the sense of pushing for
lower shorter-term interest rates and perhaps higher inflation. If the market for reserves
was close to the vertical segment, because the central bank kept the supply of reserves close
to the regulatory requirements vr, then even small changes in the monetary base had large
e↵ects on nominal interest rates and from there on inflation and the economy. The size of the
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liabilities of the central bank was a measure of the stance of monetary policy, and monetarist
proposals for using this size to control inflation were valid.
But once the central bank balance sheet grows large enough, and reserves become larger
than vs, then the size of the central bank’s balance sheet is no longer a predictor of inflation.
Further QE announcements have no e↵ect on inflation in an economy saturated with reserves.
Only announcements about interest rates on reserves, in the present or in the future, allow
the central bank to steer inflation towards its target.12
The remainder of this section investigates this empirical prediction that the first rounds
of QE may have moved inflation, but that once the size of the balance sheet grew past a
point, further QE had little e↵ect on prices. Before doing so though, the next subsection
takes a short detour to discuss general equilibrium. Readers less interested in theoretical
subtleties can skip ahead to the next subsection.
III.A An aside: general-equilibrium e↵ects of QE on real out-
comes
So far, this paper has discussed the market for reserves separately from the rest of the
economy. The implicit assumption to make this completely valid was that the amount of
reserves in the economy did not have an e↵ect on households’ choices of consumption and
work, or on firms’ choices of production or investment. Otherwise, QE might have some
direct e↵ect on real activity and real interest rates and, through that channel, on inflation.
This possibility does not invalidate the arguments that were made so far. Even if the
quantity of reserves a↵ects the real interest rate, this only changes inflation if the central
bank does not change the interest rate on reserves. If monetary policy takes this e↵ect of QE
into account in its interest-rate policy, it can undo any e↵ect of QE on inflation. Ultimately,
it is interest rates that control inflation, not QE per se. Consistent with the goal of this
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paper of focusing on inflation, one can be agnostic about the e↵ects of QE on real activity
and financial stability, because they do not undermine the (in)e↵ectiveness of the policy with
respect to inflation.
There are some reasons to be skeptical of an e↵ect of QE on real outcomes. In fact,
assuming neutrality of QE with respect to the real interest rate is more consistent with
saturation in the market for reserves. Beyond the saturation point vs, reserves provide
no liquidity services and behave just like any other financial asset. In particular, reserves
become substitutable with government bonds. But then, when the central bank through
QE issues reserves to buy government bonds, it is just exchanging two forms of government
liabilities. Each of them is denominated in nominal terms, each promises a certain nominal
return next period, and bar a fiscal crisis each delivers on this promise and leads to the same
transfer of resources between the government as a whole and the private sector. The logic
of the Modigliani-Miller theorem applied to the government then implies that this swap of
one government liability for another should have no e↵ect on any real choice.13 Moreover,
most of the reasons for why the Modigliani-Miller theorem may fail for private corporations
do not apply to QE, since reserves and government bonds have the same tax treatment and
the same governance structure of the overall government behind them.14
The academic literature has come up with four main sets of reasons why QE may have
further e↵ects on inflation through real activity, two of them financial and the other two fiscal.
The first is when there is a financial crisis that raises the value of liquidity, thus shifting vs to
the right.15 The second focuses on financial frictions that prevent arbitrage between reserves
and government securities of di↵erent maturities, so that di↵erent government securities can
then have their own clienteles.16 By issuing reserves to buy government bonds of di↵erent
maturities, the central bank can a↵ect the interest rate spreads between those assets and
potentially change the e↵ective cost of capital in di↵erent sectors of the economy. Both of
these financial arguments go back to making the economy no longer being saturated with
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reserves. Of course, by issuing even more reserves, the central bank could go back to the
saturation zone. Moreover, the evidence put forward so far, and in the rest of this section,
suggest that since 2011 or so, the U.S. economy has been saturated with reserves.
The third argument for QE to have real e↵ects is in case of a fiscal crisis. Government
bonds now carry sovereign risk, which reserves do not, since they are the unit of account. By
engaging in QE, the central bank a↵ects the overall supply of safe assets in the economy.17
However, empirically it is hard to see much evidence that QE has had an e↵ect on the
perceived default probability of the United States so far, or that there is any sovereign
risk at all priced in by financial markets. The fourth and final argument is that, if fiscal
authorities try to force the central bank to inflate away the debt by not planning to pay for
past debts, then the maturity of overall outstanding government liabilities will a↵ect the size
of the surprise debt-driven inflation. QE, by issuing short-term reserves and buying long-
term bonds, changes the maturity of the debt as long as the Treasury keeps unaltered the
maturity profile of its debt issuances. Therefore, QE will a↵ect how much surprise inflation
there is in a fiscal crisis, which via nominal rigidities a↵ects real activity. This channel
requires that the Treasury both actively manages its public finances and passively manages
the maturity of the debt.18
A large empirical literature in the last few years has established that asset purchases
by the central bank during the financial crisis had an e↵ect on financial conditions.19 The
related but di↵erent question of whether QE has an e↵ect on real activity in an economy
saturated with reserves remains unanswered.
III.B Data and empirical strategy
QE built up gradually over time and was adopted endogenously in response to macroe-
conomic conditions, so isolating its e↵ect on inflation (or anything else) poses a di cult
identification problem. The literature has dealt with this by looking not at the implemen-
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tation of the policy but at the partly unexpected announcements about QE and by relying
on financial prices to reveal the expected e↵ects of the policy rather than measuring their
actual e↵ects.20 I pursue this event-study empirical strategy here as well.
QE policies in the United States have had four stages so far. The first, QE1, refers to
the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) that started with the FOMCs November 25, 2008
announcement that it would purchase $100 billion in debt of the housing-related government-
sponsored entities and up to $500 billion in agency mortgage backed securities. There was
a second important announcement on March 18, 2009 of further purchases of $100 billion
of agency debt and $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, together with $300
billion of longer-term Treasury securities. Unfortunately, the data on inflation options that
I will use (and describe soon) is of very poor quality around this time, since the market
for these options was small and illiquid, so I can only use (noisy) data for the second date.
QE2 refers to the second round of LSAP that started on November 3rd of 2010. The FOMC
announced it would purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities. QE3
instead refers to the maturity extension program (MEP) announced on September 21 of
2011. Commonly referred to as “operation twist”, the MEP consisted of purchasing $400
billion of Treasuries with maturities between 6 and 30 years, while selling the equivalent in
securities maturing in 3 years or less. Finally, I consider a fourth event QE4, in the opposite
direction. On May 22, 2013, Chairman Bernanke stated that “in the next few meetings, we
could take a step down in our pace of purchase,” which was interpreted as a sign that the Fed
would taper its purchases of securities. Some tapering was later implemented in successive
episodes in 2014. This QE4 episode was the closest to a negative shock to QE so far.
I also consider an extra 6 dates of intermediate announcements on the scale and pace of
QE2, QE3, and QE4, giving a total of 10 event dates. The appendix describes these and why
they were chosen. For each date, I look at the change in market expectations from financial
contracts between the day before and the day after the announcement.
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The data on financial prices about inflation comes from the market for over-the-counter
inflation options. This market emerged in 2002 and has grown very quickly, so that by the
end of 2009, there is a large volume of transactions and many price quotes giving reliable
indicators of market expectations. This is after the main QE1 date. For the March 18
date, there are some data, but calculating reliable estimates of expected inflation requires
combining data from up to 6 days before and after the announcement, and is only possible
for a few maturities. For the other dates, there are market prices for future annual inflation
from one year ahead to ten years ahead, and for cumulative average inflation from the
present to 1 to 10 years ahead, as well as 12 and 15 years. Because inflation options give
market bets on whether inflation will be above or below numbers between -3% and 6% in
0.5% increments, they can be used to non-parametrically estimate the market implied risk-
adjusted probabilities of inflation. I complement these estimates with the implied volatility
in the options, and (much easier) also expected inflation from the swap rate.21
III.C QE and the distribution of expected inflation
Figure 7 plots the change in risk-neutral expected inflation according to inflation-indexed
swaps, at maturities 1 to 7 years, between the day before and the day after each of the 10
QE dates. The e↵ects are typically small, with the largest following QE1, which caused a
0.36% increase in expected inflation one year out. There is a slight downward trend in time
in the responses, but more often a bouncing up and down.
These results use only easily accessible data but they focus on a single moment in the
distribution of inflation expectations. With all the information in inflation options, which
provide estimates of the entire distribution, one can go much further. Figure 8 shows this
distribution for the four major QE dates, for the 1-year ahead expected inflation, 5-years
ahead, and finally for the average inflation over the next 10 years. For the QE1 date,
there are no reliable data for the 10-years options or the 1-year; I show instead the 3-year
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distribution. The results strikingly show how focusing on the mean can be misleading. The
shift in expectations due to QE1 is now clearly visible, not because of its modest e↵ect on
average inflation, but rather by the decline in dispersion and in the probability of the tails.
Moreover, the contrast with the other three QE dates is also apparent. QE2, QE3, and QE4
all had barely any noticeable e↵ect on any moment of the distributions at all horizons. The
exception is QE3 at the 1-year horizon, and there the distribution slightly shifted to the left,
contrary to what might be expected.
Figures 9-11 illustrate this in terms of a few useful moments but now for all 10 QE dates.
The first moment is the implied volatility in the options, one measure of the dispersion of
inflation expectations. QE1 had a very large e↵ect on this moment, but the other 9 QE
dates saw little change in dispersion. Figure 10 shows that QE1 lowered the probability of
deflation in the United States for 6 of the 7 horizons by about 15% in a short window of time.
None of the other 9 QE programs that followed had an e↵ect above 4% on the probability
of deflation.22 Figure 11 looks at the other side of the distribution, showing the change in
the probability of inflation above 4%. QE1 again lowered this probability, so that it did not
raise inflation expectations but rather compressed them.
A more systematic way to look for di↵erences is to calculate statistics for the null hypoth-
esis of no average change, as would be done in the typical regressions in event studies. Yet,
this has two shortcomings. First, it pools together all QE dates, when some were arguably
less anticipated than others, and each involved di↵erent changes on the asset side of the
central bank’s balance sheet. Second, it would focus only on one or a few moments, when
we have data on the entire distribution at each data for many di↵erent maturities.
Instead, for every date, for every horizon available from 1 year to 15 years, for both
year-on-year inflation and average cumulative inflation, I calculate the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic for a change in the distribution between the day before and the day after the QE
announcement. Figure 12 plots all 186 statistics, recalling that each is computed using 19
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percentiles of the distribution. To reject equality at the 5% significance level for a single test
would take a statistic above 0.44. Especially from QE2 onwards, almost all the statistics are
quite small, well below this threshold, reflecting what the particular moments already showed:
announcements of quantitative easing had barely any e↵ect on inflation expectations.
To conclude, the data on inflation expectations provides suggestive support for the hy-
pothesis that once the market for reserves was saturated, further announcements on changes
in the size of the liabilities of the central bank have little to no e↵ect on inflation expectations.
IV Is sustained QE financially feasible?
Reserves at the end of 2015 stood at 13.4% of U.S. GDP. The evidence in the previous
sections suggests that this amount has saturated the market for reserves, allowing the Fed
to change its amount to pursue other goals than inflation, while at the same time being free
to set the interest on reserves to aim at its inflation target. New QE policies that lower
the amount of reserves would be subject to a lower bound in vs, since if reserves fell below
this amount, the market would stop being saturated. This section investigates the upper
bound for reserves and future QE. Alternatively, it asks whether reserves can stay at their
current high levels. Keeping with the focus on liabilities and inflation, the section describes
the financial constraints of the central bank in terms of its ability to honor the promised
payments on reserves, and whether the risk of funding QE may compromise the inflation
target.
IV.A Central bank solvency
While the law has a clear definition for the solvency of a private institution or individual,
economics has no clear consensus on how to treat it. In the benchmark model of consumer
behavior, households always pay their debts, otherwise others would not lend to them.
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Therefore, in the case of a central bank (or any other government agency) where no legal
definition of insolvency applies, but at the same time there surely is some real constraint on
resources that can be created or distributed, there is an understandable confusion on what
insolvency means.
A recent literature has defined central bank insolvency as occurring when banks no longer
want to hold reserves at the central bank.23 This connects to the creation of the Federal
Reserve, for it would imply that banks no longer want to use the Fed as the clearing house.
It also has a direct link to economic theory because since reserves are liabilities of the central
bank, private banks would not want to hold them if they were a Ponzi scheme. Therefore,
requiring central bank solvency becomes equivalent to putting a no-Ponzi scheme condition
on central bank reserves not being able to explode. Finally, this definition has empirical
content. The other side of the coin from banks not wanting to hold reserves is for those
reserves’ value to be zero. But, since the real value of reserves is just the inverse of the price
level, central bank insolvency is equivalent to hyperinflation, which happens often, all over
the world.
This approach to central bank insolvency requires a second leg to stand on. If the fiscal
authorities were always willing to transfer an unlimited amount of resources to the central
bank, then central bank solvency would become subsumed by overall government solvency.
The no-Ponzi scheme constraint on reserves would be replaced by the no-Ponzi scheme
on overall government debt. Central bank insolvency is tightly connected to central bank
independence, which puts limits on the fiscal support that the central bank can receive from
the rest of the government. Being clear about the limits to the remittances (or dividends)
between the central bank and the fiscal authority, and whether these are legal or political,
then provides a clear measure of central bank solvency.24
Hall and Reis (2015) observe that for the major central banks, the strict rule in their
mandates is to pay their annual net income to the fiscal authorities. They show that, if
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this rule is followed, then the central bank will always be solvent, no matter the size of the
balance sheet or the composition of the assets. QE can be sustained and expanded without
the solvency constraint binding. However, a corollary of this result is that, depending on the
risks that it takes, the central bank may have negative net income that calls for transfers
from the fiscal authority. Especially if these are repeated, it is likely that the fiscal authority
would refuse, putting the solvency of the central bank at risk. In that case, the income risk
brought about by QE would put a limit on this monetary tool.
IV.B The income risk from QE
The net income of a central bank is equal to the seignorage from printing banknotes plus
the return it earns on its assets minus the interest it pays on reserves. Keeping the focus
on inflation, income risk matters in two ways. First, in the extreme case where the losses
push the central bank to insolvency, hyperinflation follows. Second, a central bank that faces
losses may be tempted to deviate upwards from its inflation target in order to increase its
seignorage revenue.25
Issuing reserves per se does not cause income risk. If the central bank buys very short-
term liquid government bonds with the extra reserves, it will earn the market interest rate
on the assets, while paying the interest on reserves on its funding. The gap between the
T-bill rate and the interest on reserves is approximately zero, and almost always positive.
Therefore, the solvency constraint on the size of the central bank balance sheet is lax, and
as long as the central bank can keep on buying safe short-term government bonds, it can
keep on issuing reserves.
Yet, most central banks buy other assets than short-term government bonds. Foreign
currency is one of the most prominent, and comes with income risk in the form of changes
in the exchange rate for the currency. Likewise, in response to the financial crisis, many
central banks bought privately-issued bonds, which come with the usual risk of default and
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capital losses. If reserves are issued to buy these risky assets, then saturating the market for
reserves would come with an increase in the risk that the central bank becomes insolvent.26
However, these policies are best described as exchange-rate interventions or credit easing.
QE refers instead to buying safe government bonds alone.27
Typical QE policies buy long-term government bonds. They come with a di↵erent source
of income risk: interest-rate risk. For all four of the major central banks today, a sudden
steepening of the yield curve would imply a capital loss in their large holdings of long-term
government bonds.28 Moreover, interest-rate risk causes a specific new type of danger for
inflation beyond solvency. If the central bank fears making losses on its portfolio, this may
keep its attention away from the inflation target. In particular, if the central bank fears the
income risk of a steeper yield curve, it may delay raising interest rates for too long, which
may let inflation take o↵.29
To reduce the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities and the risk associated
with it, the central bank would want to hold almost only short-term government bonds
against its reserves. For the Federal Reserve, this would require a new round of QE in the
form of a large-scale reverse operation twist. Otherwise, because this risk comes with a gain
for the fiscal authority issuing the bonds, one way to deal with it would be to redistribute
gains and losses back into fiscal hands. One alternative is to obtain further fiscal support
from the government against this risk, as the Bank of England did by using its Asset Purchase
Facility, which is indemnified by the government. Another alternative is to either provision
against this risk, or run a deferred account: whenever the central bank makes a loss, it
records it in this account, and deducts future positive net income from it before sending any
dividends to the fiscal authorities.30
Aside from interest-rate risk, buying long-term bonds raises a di↵erent constraint to the
expansion of QE. There must be enough longer-term bonds for the government to buy. At the
end of 2012, the Federal Reserve already owned a little less than half of the U.S. government
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debt of more than 5 years maturity.31 A separate constraint facing the ECB is that the
bonds of some governments have a significant amount of sovereign risk. By buying them
using risk-free reserves, the ECB raises the supply of safe assets to a particular sector of the
economy, the banking sector, which perhaps most needs it during a period of fiscal crisis and
stagnation.32 But the other side of QE is to bring sovereign risk into the balance sheet of
the central bank, to which I turn next.
IV.C A solvency upper bound for QE
Through QE, the central bank becomes one of the largest individual holders of government
debt, so a significant amount of public spending is devoted to paying interest to the central
bank. In a fiscal crisis, sovereign interest rates rise and the payments to the central bank
can become very large. It is tempting to force upon the central bank a write-o↵ of the
government debt as an alternative to further cuts in spending or increases in taxes. Given
its uncomfortable role as being a part of the government, but independent from it, the central
bank may find itself unable to prevent this loss.
Taking this fear to the extreme gives a useful bound on the feasible size of reserves. If
all of the central bank’s assets become valueless, then the central bank can only back its
reserves with the present value of its seignorage revenue from issuing banknotes. As long
as reserves are lower than the present value of seignorage, the central bank can back these
liabilities with the future flows of seignorage, retiring them over time without running a
Ponzi scheme. The present value of seignorage therefore gives a solvency upper bound for
the central bank: in the worst case scenario where all of its assets return  100%, the central
bank will be solvent as long as reserves are below this upper bound.
Estimating the present value of seignorage presents a few challenges each leading to un-
certainty on the estimates. First, one needs to choose among di↵erent models for seignorage,
and especially for how it changes with inflation. Second, one needs to estimate the param-
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eters of each model. Third, one needs a valid stochastic discount factor to discount future
seignorage revenues that depend on the level of inflation. And fourth, one needs a risk-free
rate with which to discount the future. Hilscher et al. (2016) find that the two quantitatively
largest sources of estimation uncertainty are the first and last: the model used, and the safe
rate for discounting. Table 4 shows some of their estimates across di↵erent combinations for
each.
Across columns are the models used to estimate the seignorage function. Partial-equilibrium
models estimate the seignorage function directly, by relating seignorage to inflation alone.
General-equilibrium models add the Phillips consideration that inflation may a↵ect real vari-
ables which then feed into seignorage, and so estimate the seignorage function as one relation
within a macroeconomic system. Reduced-form estimates use unrestricted regressions, while
structural ones use economic models to pin down how seignorage varies with inflation.
Across rows are the risk-free rates used. The first row uses 2% to discount the future.
This is a conventional choice using historical U.S. data to match the di↵erence between the
after-tax return to capital of about 4% and the growth rate real GDP per capita of about
2% per year. The field of climate change has seen some of the most heated debates on what
value should be used to discount the future. The second row uses the Stern review’s choice
of 1.4%. Finally, the last row uses a discount rate based on market real rates in forwards
markets, leading to a discount rate of 1.08%. Unsurprisingly, the lower the discount rate is,
the higher the present value of distant seignorage, so the higher the solvency upper bound.
The di↵erent estimates of the present value of seignorage are all above 10-11% of GDP,
the value of outstanding reserves in 2011-12, after which our previous estimates confidently
suggested that the market for reserves was saturated. Even considering the worst case
scenario in the solvency upper bound calculations, QE has not put the central bank solvency
at risk. The elevated balance sheet of the Federal Reserve appears to be sustainable. Further
rounds of QE may face up against the solvency constraint, but judging by this extremely
25
conservative measure, that risk is still far away for the United States.33
V The composition of QE
So far, this paper argued that the U.S. market for reserves since 2011 has been saturated,
so changes in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet have little e↵ect on inflation, but changes
in nominal interest rates do. Following a policy rule to set nominal interest rates today and
to provide forward guidance for the future allows the central bank to pursue its inflation
target. Yet, when nominal interest rates are close to zero, one might worry the central bank
is out of policy tools. This section argues that this is not the case. With a saturated market
for reserves, if the central bank finds itself very far from its target, it can innovate on the
composition of the central bank liabilities. This section considers three such innovations for
desperate times: the first is to issue banknotes instead of reserves, the second is to change
the way reserves are remunerated, and the third is to change their maturity.
Right away note that while all three are somewhat radical, they have been used before
either in smaller scales or with other goals. Centuries ago, central banks in Europe almost
entirely issued banknotes in their operations, although their focus was on balancing the
collection of seignorage against the control of inflation and they were frequently on the verge
of insolvency or past it. Many central banks have also in the past accepted deposits of
di↵erent maturities, including from the public, but these were used to make loans on the
asset side as the central bank performed banking operations allocating credit to some sectors
in the economy. The proposals studied here stay within the strict realm of monetary policy
and the focus on inflation. Moreover, note that households and firms might react to these
changes by being reluctant to hold the banknotes or the new reserves, but this does not
imply the policies were a failure at raising inflation. After all, if economic agents are less
willing to hold these units of account, that means their value goes down, which just means
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the price level will go up.
V.A Currency instead of reserves
In the simplest version, this proposal consists of the central bank printing banknotes and
giving them out for free to private agents. Milton Friedman famously illustrated this with
a helicopter flown by the central bank dropping banknotes over a crowd. A more practical
alternative would consist of the government issuing government bonds to pay for checks sent
to households, just like it does with other social transfers, and perhaps subject to similar
attempts at targeting. The central bank would then print banknotes to buy these government
bonds and immediately write them o↵ from its balance sheet leading to the same end result,
but now using the fiscal authority as the distributor. This version is sometimes called overt
monetary financing of the deficit.
Just like the discussion of QE in this paper, this proposal also expands the central bank’s
balance sheet, it also focuses on the liabilities, and it also has a main goal of raising inflation.
At the same time, it is quite di↵erent because a di↵erent liability is used and the assets
bought are worthless. More importantly, this policy’s e↵ect on inflation works through three
channels that are distinct from those discussed in this paper so far. In fact, helicopter money
is the antithesis of QE.
The argument for helicopter money starts by assuming that the central bank can perfectly
control the supply of banknotes and so permanently raise it forever. With more money
chasing the same goods, the argument goes, prices must rise.34 Yet, recall again that in the
current monetary system, the central bank does not exogenously choose how many banknotes
to print. If banks choose to bring their banknotes to the central bank and deposit them as
reserves, it must honor this request. Because banknotes earn zero interest, households would
be expected to deposit these banknotes in banks to earn a positive deposit rate, who in turn
would deposit them as reserves at the central bank to earn the positive interest on reserves.
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There is little evidence that households are constrained from carrying the desired amount of
banknotes in their pockets, so this substitution towards reserves would likely be large. The
central bank might print many banknotes to end up with the same currency in circulation
and just an increase in reserves, just like in standard QE.35
The only way to solve this control problem would be to stop paying interest on reserves,
which would lead to a dramatic contraction in the size of the balance sheet of the central
bank as excess reserves would go to zero very quickly: it would be the end of QE. To prevent
it, the central bank would have to dramatically raise the required reserves that banks must
hold at the central bank. In terms of figure 3, this would shift vr to the right of vs and
the demand curve would now have an L-shape, vertical at the required level of reserves, vr
and horizontal to the right of this point. Yet, this would amount to a significant financial
repression, as banks would be forced to hold around 10% of GDP at the central bank for no
interest; when nominal market interest rates are back to their usual level of 4%, this would
amount to a $74 billion annual tax on the financial sector.
Second, the increase in the supply of banknotes must meet a stable demand for real
balances to generate the permanent increase in the price level. Decades of experience with
monetarism and measuring the demand for banknotes has found that there are large and
frequent shocks to the desire to hold banknotes, both in the short and in the long run.
Calibrating the necessary increase in banknotes to obtain a desired increase in the price level
is a daunting task. More fundamentally, the Lucas critique would be sure to hit in full force.
With central bankers announcing they would be sending checks to each citizen, journalists
describing how the printing press was running out of ink working overnight, and economists
commenting that this was a permanent new state of the world, it seems likely that trust in
the monetary system would be questioned leading to unpredictable shifts in the demand for
currency. In contrast, QE relied only on staying in the horizontal segment of the demand
curve for reserves.
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Finally, the third part of the argument for why monetary financing of the deficit works
comes from the fiscal stimulus it provides, which tends to raise economic activity, and in
doing so stimulate inflation. The size of the transfer to households is equal to the seignorage
revenue that the central bank no longer collects, and it is also matched by smaller transfers
from the central bank to the fiscal authority every year from then onwards. QE instead is a
fiscally neutral policy: because government liabilities are created to buy other government
liabilities, the overall fiscal stance is unaltered.36
V.B Real payment on reserves
The central bank is the monopoly issuer of reserves, which are the unit of account. In
the same way that in an economy saturated with reserves, the central bank can choose
whichever nominal interest rate it wishes to pay on those reserves, it could alternatively
choose to remunerate reserves di↵erently. Hall and Reis (2016), building on earlier work by
Hall (1997), proposed in 2012 an alternative way of remunerating reserves that would give
the central bank better control over the price level.
Instead of promising an interest rate, the central bank could o↵er reserves that promised
an indexed payment. For each $1 of reserves, the bank could receive a payment tomorrow
that was indexed to the price level then. If the promise was of x and the price level p today
and p0 tomorrow, the payment would be (1 + x)p0. Abstracting away from uncertainty, the
real return on reserves would be (1 + x)p0(p/p0). Arbitrage ensures that this would be equal
to the safe real interest rate in private investments in the economy r. Therefore, the price
level would be p = (1 + r)/(1 + x).
For a given estimate of the safe real rate, if the price level was running below target, the
central bank could lower the payment on reserves, and in doing so raise prices. The intuition
for how this works is the following. When the central bank promises a smaller payment,
reserves are a less attractive investment, so banks will not want to hold them, and their
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real value must fall. But since their real value is the inverse of the price level, prices must
rise. As banks adjust their portfolios, the movement in savings and investment caused by
a change in the promised payments will give firms the incentive to change their prices until
equilibrium is restored. By promising a payment on reserves, the central bank gains a new
tool with which to control the price level. Hall and Reis (2016) discuss many implementation
details with this proposal and more thought and research would have to be put into it before
applying it.
V.C Forward reserves
Currently, reserves are overnight deposits. During the crisis, central banks innovated with
the time dimension of their liquidity programs. More prominently, the ECB complemented
its one-week main refinancing operations (MRO) with longer-term repurchase agreements
(LTRO) with maturities that ranged from 3 months to 3 years. There is no significant
barrier to innovating as well with the maturity of deposits at the central bank. Banks could
be o↵ered the option to deposit funds at the central bank not just overnight, but also for
longer durations.
If the e↵ective overnight interest rate on these di↵erent reserve instruments were all the
same, this would make little to no di↵erence. The interest rates that applied to the ECB’s
LTRO program were variable and indexed to the MRO rate. In this case, the central bank
continues to have a single policy instrument, the overnight return on reserves, and o↵ering
longer-duration reserves would not change the ability to control the price level.
If the central bank instead o↵ered a fixed interest rate on these programs, the situation
changes. In the same way that paying an overnight rate on reserves allows the central bank
to a↵ect overnight rates, forward reserves of longer maturities would give the central bank
some ability to a↵ect forward nominal interest rates associated with di↵erent maturities.
O↵ering a menu of forward reserves of di↵erent maturities up to a certain horizon for banks
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to hold, the central bank could exert direct influence on the nominal yield curve until that
horizon. With a real yield curve determined in the equilibrium of the economy, this would
give the central bank an additional tool to control expected inflation at di↵erent horizons in
financial markets.
VI Conclusion
In the 1970s, research on central banking focused on real activity and the use of price controls
and credit restrictions, yet the central banks of advanced economies found themselves unable
to keep either inflation or unemployment from rising. A backlash against Keynesianism
emerged and monetarism arose emphasizing inflation over real stability in the mandate of
the central bank, and researching the theoretical properties of money, the empirical features
of the demand for currency, the measurement of monetary aggregate multiples, and policies
that targeted non-borrowed reserves.
In 2016, the concern is instead low inflation. The deviation from the mandate is today
very far from being as severe as four decades ago, but the last two years and expected next
two suggest a sizable downward risk to the price level. Moreover, recent and current research
has partly neglected this risk emphasizing instead real and financial stability and on how
targeted asset purchases can promote it. This paper argued for refocusing on the inflation
mandate and on the liabilities-side of the central bank balance sheet. Where monetarism
proposed a money-growth rule as a preferred policy and studied the demand for money,
shocks to money supply, and the composition of monetary aggregates, this paper studies the
policy of quantitative easing and tried to push forward research on the demand for bank
reserves, the surprise component of QE announcements, and the composition of the funding
side of QE.
The analysis concluded that QE shifted the market for reserves to a region where the
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demand for reserves is horizontal and the supply vertical. Further expansions of the size of
reserves are likely to have little e↵ect on inflation, similar to the last rounds of QE, but by
keeping the market saturated with reserves, they allow the central bank to use the interest
rate on reserves to steer inflation. The current level of reserves is below the solvency upper
bound for the Federal Reserve, and a large-scale reverse operation twist that re-populated
the asset side of the balance sheet with short-term government bonds would almost eliminate
any income risk. Overall, there are benefits to keeping the market for reserves saturated in
order to be able to direct interest-rate policy directly to the control of inflation, while leaving
QE for other goals.
Looking forward, keeping the market for reserves saturated is consistent with returning
to a lean central-bank balance sheet. This means not zero excess reserves but rather closer
to 1 trillion, or the size of the balance sheet in 2011, not pre 2008. The Federal Reserve
can return to focussing on setting interest rates in order to control inflation, but now with
its main target being the interest on reserves instead of the federal funds rate (and with a
constant spread with respect to the interest on overnight reverse repos and the interest on
the discount window). If more radical measures are needed to keep inflation near its target,
I suggested innovating in the types of reserves issued while keeping the focus on the interest
paid on them.
Throughout the discussion, there were many references to how fiscal authorities would
respond. It is a general lesson of macroeconomics that the interaction of fiscal and monetary
policy determines inflation (and other aggregate variables) so that the precise rules by which
central banks are independent from fiscal authorities in some regards, but cooperate with
them in others, are central to keeping inflation on target.37 With a larger central bank balance
sheet, the fiscal implications of monetary policy become more pronounced, so these rules
become more important. How the market for reserves gets taxed, how financial regulation
undertaken outside of the central bank treats bank reserves, how the central bank manages
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its income risk, how dividends from the central bank are set, how government bonds held by
the central bank are treated during a fiscal crisis, or how transfers of seignorage to the public
would be o↵set by other fiscal transfers, are some of the many questions that arose and that
were discussed. At one extreme, the central bank could change the assets in its balance
sheet to consist of almost only short-term government bonds, and choose interest rates on
reserves, and in doing so minimize the reliance on interactions with the fiscal authority. At
the other extreme, it could do helicopter drops of banknotes, which are a clear fiscal policy
in substitution of the fiscal authority. Where to be in between these two extremes will surely
take central stage in debates on monetary policy in the next few years.
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Appendix
A Harmonizing central bank balance sheets
Central banks are peculiar institutions. Their balance sheets are varied in their categories,
they have some original methods to account for some activities, and they employ some
concepts that are alien to someone trained in financial reporting for private institutions,
from the Federal Reserve’s reasoning for not booking government bonds to market, to the
ECB’s revaluation accounts that asymmetrically record capital gains on some assets, and
including Bank of England’s three separate balance sheets for the issuing department, the
banking department and the asset purchase facility. Figure 1 puts forward my e↵ort to
rearrange the published accounts in a comparable way across the four institutions using a
few key categories, and hopes to inspire others to expand and refine this harmonization work.
All the data is annual, covering the period from 2005-15, with the exception of the BoJ,
for which there is no GDP data for 2015, and the Bank of England, because of a change in
accounting procedures in 2007.
Federal Reserve: The source of the data is the annual reports of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, tables 2 and 9a. (1) Gold and foreign assets are gold and SDRs; (2) other assets include
all else, especially the rescue operations in 2008; (3) short-term gov. bonds are holdings of
Treasury bills; (4) long-term gov. bonds are holdings of Treasury bonds, agency debt and
MBS; (5) capital is the sum of paid-in capital and surplus; (6) currency are banknotes; (7)
others include repos and other liabilities; (8) bank reserves are deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks.
European Central Bank: The source of the data is the annual report for the consolidated
Eurosystem balance sheet. (1) Gold and foreign assets are gold and lending in foreign
currency; (2) other assets include other assets and lending to non-euro area residents; (3)
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MRO is lending to euro area credit institutions as part of main refinancing operations; (4a)
LTRO is lending to euro area credit institutions as part of long-term refinancing operations;
(4b) Securities sums securities held plus government debt of Euroarea residents; (5a) capital
is capital plus reserves; (5b) is the revaluation account from marking some assets to market;
(6) currency is banknotes (7) others include assorted liabilities not related to monetary
operations; (8) bank reserves are liabilities to euro area credit institutions.
Bank of England: The source of the data is the Bank of England historical balance sheet
and the annual reports for the Annual Purchase Facility. (1) Gold and foreign assets are
always zero; (2) other assets include advances to the government, central bank bonds, and
other securities; (3) Short-term repos are short-term repurchase agreements; (4) long-term
gov. bonds comes from apportioning the APFs holdings of gilts to the Bank of England by
the ratio of the APF liabilities to the Bank of England as a ratio of total assets; (5) capital
is always zero; (6) currency is banknotes (7) others include FC public securities, cash ratio
deposits, and others; (8) bank reserves are reserve balances.
Bank of Japan: The source of the data is the Bank of Japan annual review. (1) Gold and
foreign assets are gold plus foreign currency assets; (2) other assets include cash, receivables,
pecuniary trusts, fixed assets and others; (3) Short-term gov. bonds; (4) Long-term gov.
bonds; (5) capital sum capital paid in, reserves and net income; (6) currency is banknotes
(7) others include deposits of the government, payables under repos and provisions for losses;
(8) bank reserves are deposits at the central bank excluding the government.
B Mathematical details behind figure 3
A bank optimally choosing its level of real reserves vt at date t, takes into account their
promised return (1+ivt ) as well as the liquidity benefits they give in terms of a marginal profit
function B(v) : [vrt ,1] ! IR+0 that has a non-positive derivative capturing the diminishing
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marginal benefits of liquidity and a satiation point vst such that B(v) = 0 for v   vst . The
optimality condition of the bank is:
Et

mt,t+1
✓
pt
pt+1
◆
(1 + ivt )
 
+B(vt) = 1, (A1)
where mt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor used by the bank on its investment between t
and t+1, and pt is the price level. At the same time, the bank could invest in other financial
assets, with potentially risky return it+1, and for those the optimality condition is:
Et

mt,t+1
✓
pt
pt+1
◆
(1 + it+1)
 
= 1. (A2)
Combining the two equations gives the demand curve plotted in figure 3:
B(vt) = Et

mt,t+1
✓
pt
pt+1
◆
(it+1   ivt )
 
(A3)
where the price of reserves on the right-hand side is the expected (Et) risk adjusted (mt,t+1)
real (pt/pt+1) return on alternative assets (it+1) minus that on reserves (ivt ) as stated in the
text.
Beyond the saturation point, the optimality condition for reserves becomes:
(1 + ivt )

Et(mt,t+1)Et
✓
pt
pt+1
◆
+ Covt
✓
mt,t+1,
pt
pt+1
◆ 
= 1. (A4)
Recall that 1+rt = 1/Et(mt,t+1) is the safe real interest rate, and approximate this expression
by ignoring the covariance term as in a linear approximation. Then, after taking logs and
using the usual approximation that log(1 + x) ⇡ x and the definition of inflation ⇡t+1 =
  log(pt+1), we get:
ivt = rt + Et(⇡t+1) (A5)
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For a fixed rt a higher ivt raises expected inflation, the Fisher e↵ect. But, since in a standard
macroeconomic model mt,t+1 is the ratio of marginal utilities over time, then rt is approxi-
mately proportional to the expected growth rate of consumption (the Ramsey-Euler result)
and in turn the Phillips curve relates the current level of consumption positively to inflation.
Combining these gives a a negative relation r(⇡t+1), and so a negative relation between the
nominal interest rate and inflation in the short run, keeping inflation expectations fixed.
C Bank-level data on reserves
The primary data in the analysis comes from the call reports available for over 6,000 banks
from the FFIEC website (https://cdr. ec.gov/public/PWS/DownloadBulkData.aspx). The
years in analysis are 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015 and in all cases only data from the 4th
quarter are used. The variable names and codes available from the FFIEC data are: (i) Total
assets (RCON217); (ii) Total deposits (RCON2200); (iii) Reserves with FED (RCON0090);
(iv)US treasuries, both held and available for sale (RCON0213 summed to RCON1287).
The definitions of all variables are available from the FED Micro Data Reference Manual
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/mdrm/ ). The dataset consists of a repeated cross
section of banks which reports data on reserves for 2388 banks in 2015, 2179 in 2011, 2098
in 2007 and 2154 in 2005.
D QE dates
The main QE dates are:
QE1: March 18, 2009. The FOMC statement announced that the Federal Reserve would
purchase up to an additional $100 billion of agency debt and $750 billion of agency mortgage-
backed securities, bringing the total size of the respective purchase programs to $200 billion
37
and $1.25 trillion. The statement also introduced the decision to purchase up to $300 billion
of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months.
QE2: November 3, 2010. The FOMC formally announced that it would purchase a
further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of
2011, a pace of about $75 billion a month. This announcement was widely anticipated, and
it is possible that markets may have expected a larger QE program. For example, Goldman
Sachs expectation was for about $750 billion in QE2. In addition, related announcements
on November 4 - jobless claims and productivity - complicate interpreting changes around
this date as solely the result of the FOMC announcement.
QE3: September 21, 2011. The FOMC announced that it would extend the average
maturity of its holdings of securities (Operation Twist). It was stated that “the Committee
intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with re-
maining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities
with remaining maturities of 3 years or less. This program should put downward pressure on
longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative.”
In addition, it was announced that principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS
would be reinvested in agency MBS, to help support conditions in mortgage markets.
QE-Taper: May 22, 2013. Chairman Bernanke gave testimony before the Joint Economic
Committee. The prepared remarks reiterated existing Fed policy. In response to subsequent
questions, Chairman Bernanke stated that “in the next few meetings, we could take a step
down in our pace of purchase.” This was interpreted by some market participants that the
Fed would begin to taper its purchases of securities, despite the balanced tone of the prepared
remarks.
On top of these, following Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Gagnon
et al. (2011), I used a few more dates of announcements:
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QE2: August 10, 2010. The FOMC announced that Fed holdings of securities would be
held constant at their current level by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and
agency MBS in longer-term Treasury securities, while maturing Treasury securities would
continue to be rolled over at auction. The market expectation prior to this announcement
was that the Fed MBS portfolio would gradually decline in size. Also novel was the shift
towards longer-term Treasuries, rather than reinvestment in agency debt or agency MBS.
QE2: September 21, 2010 The FOMC statement maintained the existing policy of rein-
vesting principal payments from its security holdings, and also stated that the Committee
was “prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic re-
covery,” which represented a shift in language from the previous statement, in which the
Committee stated that it “will employ its policy tools as necessary to promote economic re-
covery and price stability.” Many market participants interpreted this shift in language as a
signal that the Fed would provide additional stimulus, and purchases of long-term Treasuries
in particular.
QE3: August 31, 2012. Chairman Bernanke gave a speech at Jackson Hole that was
interpreted by some market participants as signaling that there was room for additional
policy accommodation.
QE3: September 13, 2012 The FOMC announced that it would increase policy accom-
modation by purchasing additional agency MBS at a pace of $40 billion per month. This
together with the existing maturity extension and principal reinvestment programs were an-
ticipated to increase holdings of longer-term securities by around $85 billion each month,
through the end of 2012.
QE3: December 12, 2012 The FOMC announced that after its program to extend the
average maturity of its holdings of Treasury securities was completed at the end of the year,
it would purchase longer-term Treasury securities, initially at a pace of $45 billion per month.
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In January it also planned to resume rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.
QE-Taper: June 19, 2013 Chairman Bernanke gave a press conference in which there
was further discussion of tapering. He stated that “the committee currently anticipates
that it will be appropriate to moderate the monthly pace of purchases later this year”, and
that under a baseline “moderately optimist” forecast, “we would expect probably to slow or
moderate purchases some time later this year, and then through the middle of-through the
early part of next year, and ending, in that scenario, somewhere in the middle of the year.”
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Notes
1Among many others, see Adrian and Shin (2010) or Gertler and Karadi (2013).
2See also Woodford (2016) for the interaction of QE and inflation with the zero lower bound.
3There is an active discussion on whether to interpret the legal mandate of the central bank as a price-level
as opposed to an inflation target, and on what would be optimal (Reis, 2013a).
4In this conference, Goodfriend (2016) proposes breaking the one-to-one exchange rate between cash and
reserves, while keeping reserves as the unit of account.
5The appendix formalizes this discussion. See also Friedman and Kuttner (2010).
6The central bank could choose to vary this requirement with the price of reserves, and the requirement
is often expressed as a ratio to other endogenous variables, like the amount of deposits in the bank, which
in general equilibrium may depend on the return on reserves. Therefore, the demand for required reserves
need not be strictly vertical. This is immaterial for the discussion of QE, which involves voluntary excess
reserves, moving the market always to the right of vr.
7See Beltran et al. (2015).
8Friedman and Kuttner (2010) present evidence that before 2008, the market for reserves was close to
the vertical range of demand.
9Ennis and Wolman (2015).
10Woodford (2003) is a classic reference and Reis (2015b) a recent survey.
11Du e and Krishnamurthy (2016) in this conference argue for complementing movements in the interest
on reserves with parallel movements in the interest rate on overnight reverse repurchase agreements.
12See also Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011).
13Wallace (1981).
14Greenwood et al. (2016) in this conference discuss reasons why the maturity mismatch between reserves
and even short-duration government bonds a↵ects financial markets.
15Bernanke (2015).
16For instance, Vayanos and Vila (2009) or Greenwood et al. (2015b).
17Caballero et al. (2016) or Reis (2016b).
18Cochrane (2014), Reis (2016b) and Greenwood et al. (2015a).
19Joyce et al. (2012) is an already outdated summary.
20For instance Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Gagnon et al. (2011).
21See Hilscher et al. (2014) for more explanations on the data.
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22See also Kitsul and Wright (2013).
23Reis (2013b), Hall and Reis (2015), Del Negro and Sims (2015), Reis (2015a), Benigno and Nistico
(2015), among others.
24See Sims (2003), Hall and Reis (2015), and Del Negro and Sims (2015). Reis (2015a) explores di↵erent
lower bound constraints on the transfers from the fiscal authority to the central bank. Note that central
bank net worth by itself is not a meaningful concept for a central bank in the same way it is not for the
government as a whole, unlike what happens with private corporations.
25Del Negro and Sims (2015).
26Reis (2016a) discusses in detail the many sources of income risk that a central bank may face.
27The situation is more interesting in a currency union where some sovereign debt has a high risk of
default. In that case, together with the income risk, there is a scope for using the central bank balance sheet
to redistribute across regions (Reis, 2013b), which may be desirable or not.
28Bassetto and Messer (2013) and Hall and Reis (2015).
29Berriel and Bhattarai (2009) and Bhattarai et al. (2015).
30Hall and Reis (2015) and Benigno and Nistico (2015).
31Hilscher et al. (2014).
32Reis (2016b).
33One source of risk that these calculations ignore is that coming from private digital currencies that
displace the use of banknotes, therefore capturing the seignorage revenues from the central bank. It is still
too early to gauge how serious is this danger: for instance looking at two countries where financial technology
is booming, Sweden and the United Kingdom, seignorage from banknotes has clearly fallen in the former in
the last five years, but it has been elevated in the latter.
34See Krugman (1998) or Turner (2015).
35If the interest on reserves was brought to a significant negative value, then people may reach the point
of indi↵erence between banknotes and on reserves. But as soon as interest rates rise, the same argument
would apply, and the currency in circulation would fall then. It is well known (Auerbach and Obstfeld, 2005;
Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2011) that printing banknotes during a zero lower bound only raises the price level if
the supply of banknotes remains higher after the economy leaves the zero lower bound.
36Reis (2016a) discusses at length the changes in fiscal stance that result from central bank actions.
37See Leeper (2010) for an example in this conference series.
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Figure	3.	Equilibrium	in	the	market	for	reserves	
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Table	1.	The	demand	curve	for	reserves	
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Reserves Reserves Reserves Reserves Reserves Reserves
iReserves   iFederalFunds -0.174 -0.119 -0.199 -0.467**
(0.112) (0.112) (0.127) (0.185)
iReserves   iTbill 0.0140 0.187 0.0878 0.352
(0.156) (0.162) (0.171) (0.219)
Obs 53 53 53 53 53 88
Trend No No Yes Yes No No
F Test 2.40 0.01 1.93 2.40 1.40 3.49**
Adj. R sq. 0.022 0.019 0.033 0.043 0.010 0.087
Notes: The left-hand side in all regressions is the di↵erence in log real reserves. In columns
1 to 5, the sample goes from December 2011 to June 2016; in column 6 it starts in December
2008. A time trend is included in columns 3 to 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1
Correlation Table
Reserve / Deposits
2005 2007 2011 2015
2005 1
2007 0.477*** 1
2011 0.256*** 0.870*** 1
2015 0.018 0.315*** 0.018 1
Notes: *** p<0.01.
1
Table	2.	Correla+on	matrix	for	reserves/deposits	
of	same	bank	across	+me	
Figure	5.	Distribu+on	func+ons	of	reserves/deposits	across	banks	
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Correlation Table
Reserve / Assets
2005 2007 2011 2015
2005 1
2007 0.510*** 1
2011 0.152*** 0.179*** 1
2015 0.139*** 0.167*** 0.619*** 1
Notes: *** p<0.01.
1
Table	3.	Correla+on	matrix	for	reserves/assets	
of	sam 	bank	across	+me	
Figure	6.	Distribu+on	func+ons	of	reserves/assets	across	banks	
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Figure	7.	Change	in	expected	average	inﬂa+on	
around	QE	dates	
Figure	9.	Change	in	expected	vola+lity	of	inﬂa+on	
around	QE	dates	
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Figure	10.	Change	in	expected	probability	of	deﬂa+on	
around	QE	dates	
Figure	11.	Change	in	expected	probability	of	inﬂa+on	above	4%	
around	QE	dates	
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Figure	12.	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	sta+s+cs	for	a	change	in	the	
distribu+on	of	inﬂa+on	for	all	horizons	at	each	QE	date	
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Table	4.	The	solvency	upper	bound	for	QE	by	the	Fed	
Present value of seignorage
Estimation method
Partial equilibrium General equilibrium
Discounting Reduced-form Structural Reduced-form Structural
Historical 19.0 16.4 13.8 19.0
Climate-change 25.8 22.5 25.8 18.7
Market-based 32.5 28.4 32.5 23.7
Notes: All numbers expressed as % of GDP
1
